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Does	physics	make	us	free?	Review	of	J.T.	Ismael,	‘How	physics	makes	us	free’,	OUP	Natalja	Deng	&	Klaas	Landsman	(forthcoming	in	Metascience)			The	book	under	review	is	about	the	‘‘apparent	conflict	between	what	physics	says	and	what	we	feel	instinctively	about	our	own	actions’’	(x).	In	particular,	we	feel	that	our	actions	are	free,	whereas	classical	physics,	to	which	the	author	restricts	herself,	describes	the	universe	as	a	deterministic	clockwork,	at	least	at	a	fundamental	level.	Some	would	argue	that	her	restriction	to	classical	physics	in	matters	like	this	is	a	serious	flaw,	but	in	fact	we	agree	with	Ismael	that	quantum	physics	would	hardly	make	a	difference	to	her	account,	except	perhaps	as	a	threat	to,	rather	than	as	an	enabler	of	free	will.	In	other	words,	this	is	a	book	about	free	will.	Yes,	yet	another!	But	it	defends	the	compatibilist	position	in	a	strikingly	original	and	sophisticated	way,	and	includes	an	unusual	emphasis	on	the	concept	of	the	self.	Perhaps	it	would	be	even	better	to	call	this	a	book	about	the	self	with	applications	to	free	will.	We	do	wish	to	note	that	although	Ismael	has	written	her	book	for	‘‘the	man	on	the	Clapham	omnibus	with	an	interest	in	understanding	what	it	is	to	be	human’’	(xi),	it	seems	to	us	that	she	overestimates	this	man.	What	we	have	here	is	an	academic	philosophy	book,	whose	only	compromise	toward	popular	appeal	is	that	it	is	very	well	written,	in	a	punchy	style	that	often	makes	it	a	page-turner.		Part	I	focuses	on	the	self.	It	asks	what	we	are	and	how	we	fit	into	the	natural	world.	Selves	are	not	fundamental	entities	but	higher	level	or	derived	ones:	they	emerge	as	the	brain	‘‘stabilizes	separable	conceptions	of	self	and	world	out	of	patterns	in	sensory	information’’	(16).	This	process	involves,	for	example,	the	separation	of	information	about	objects	and	information	about	one’s	spatial	relation	to	those	objects.	It	involves	learning	to	make	a	distinction	between	what	one	does	and	what	happens	to	one,	as	well	as	becoming	aware	of	oneself	as	an	object	perceived	by	others.	It	involves	gaining	and	refining	a	conception	of	oneself	as	a	full	autobiographical	subject,	a	locus	of	value	with	a	rich	personal	history.	Through	this	process,	the	world	-as	-I	-see	-it		becomes	articulated	into	the	world	-as	I	see	it	.	The	concepts	of	oneself,	on	the	one	hand,	and	of	the	world	as	distinct	from	oneself,	on	the	other	hand,	are	jointly	produced:	‘‘the	construction	of	a	point	of	view	literally	gives	rise	to	the	existence	of	a	subject	that	occupies	it	…		the	unity	of	the	viewpoint	is	not	presupposed	by	integration;	it	is	the	product	of	integration’’	(60).	Intriguing	as	this	story	surely	is,	why	accept	it?	The	default	position,	if	there	is	one,	is	that	points	of	view	are	had	,	i.e.,	occupied,	and	that	they	are	not	identical	with	those	who	have	,	i.e.,	occupy,	them.	As	a	result,	to	explain	how	a	point	of	view	is	constructed	(by	whom?)	is	not	yet	to	explain	how	the	occupiers	come	into	being.	Moreover,	though	the	author	is	generally	sensitive	to	contemporary	science,	the	book	contains	no	discussion	of	cognitive	neuroscience.	Hence	it	fails	to	relate	the	picture	of	the	self	it	sketches	to	anything	in	that	direction,	even	theoretically.	This	must	be	a	deliberate	choice,	since	it	is	clear	from	her	talks	and	other	writings	that	Ismael	is	certainly	familiar	with	experimental	as	well	as	theoretical	neuroscience.	Another	central	idea	is	that	we	are	often	comparable	to	corporations	and	other	‘‘self-governing	systems’’,	i.e.,	‘‘complex	systems	whose	global	behaviour	is	guided	by	a	subsystem’’	(39),	such	as	the	executive	committee	or	even	just	the	CEO.	This	is	an	interesting	analogy,	but	it	is	assumed	rather	than	argued	for.	Perhaps	the	author	expects	the	reader	to	be	familiar	with	her	earlier	book,	The	Situated	Self	.	It	also	remains	unclear	which	lessons	to	draw	from	it.	For	example,	Ismael	declines	to	take	a	stand	on	whether	it	has	implications	for	the	question	of	how	consciousness	arises	(76).	Given	that	her	aim	is	to	steer	a	middle	course	between	Cartesian	dualism	and	‘‘Dennettian	nolipsism’’,	the	view	that	there	are	no	selves,	understood	as	Cartesian	substances,	this	may	come	as	a	surprise.	Alas,	Ismael	leaves	the	problem	of	the	place	of	consciousness	in	the	natural	world	to	others.	Part	II	takes	on	free	will.	If	one	sees	the	problem	of	free	will	as	the	inherent	contradiction	between	the	poles	‘‘free	’’,	which	seems	to	presuppose	the	ability	to	do	otherwise	and	hence	some	kind	of	indeterminism,	and	‘‘will	’’,	which	assumes	agency	and	deliberation,	and	hence	effective	determinism,	then	Ismael	puts	herself	squarely	in	the	compatibilist	camp,	which	endorses	determinism	as	well	as	freedom,	and	tries	to	talk	itself	out	of	the	(apparent?)	contradiction.	To	her	credit,	she	fully	takes	the	
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bull	by	the	horns,	unlike	philosophers	who	go	for	a	free	ride	by	focusing	on	one	of	these	two	poles	only.	Ismael’s	main	point	is	that	although	fundamental,	objective,	microscopic	classical	physics	is	indeed	deterministic,	this	is	a	red	herring,	since	the	physics	relevant	to	free	will	is	higher	level,	perspectival,		and	macroscopic	.	In	particular,	her	claim	is	that	the	Consequence	Argument	is	based	on	the	wrong	level	of	physics	and	hence	makes	something	like	a	category	mistake.	In	brief,	the	Consequence	Argument	holds	that	our	actions	are	entailed	by	the	past	and	by	the	laws	of	nature,	neither	of	which	are	under	our	control,	so	that	our	actions	are	not	under	our	control	either.	Thus,	Ismael	rethinks	the	concept	of	a	law	of	nature	and	its	(ab)use	in	the	Consequence	Argument.	Following	Cartwright,	Pearl,	and	others,	she	resuscitates	the	idea	of	causation	in	the	wake	of	its	famous	dismissal	by	Russell.	And	she	invokes	irreversibility	and	the	Boltzmann-Albert	Past	Hypothesis		about	the	direction	of	time	and	the	entropy	of	the	universe.	Finally,	she	appeals	to	the	Paradox	of	Predictability	,	which	disentangles	‘‘external’’	(i.e.,	Laplacian)	predictability	from	‘‘internal’’	predictability	(i.e.,	yielding	results	accessible	to	the	agent,	which	the	paradox	shows	to	be	impossible),	in	order	to	undermine	the	significance	of	determinism	for	free	will.	All	these	arguments	are,	of	course,	deeply	interlocked,	if	only	by	the	underlying	theme	of	emergence,	which	already	played	a	major	role	in	Ismael’s	discussion	of	the	self	in	Part	I	of	the	book.	Metaphorically,	we	are	to	think	of	world	history	as	analogous	to	a	play	or	novel	like	Hamlet		or	Anna	Karenina	,	which	unfolds	as	the	author	writes,	previous	parts	placing	few	constraints	on	the	actions	of	the	characters.	Hamlet	or	Anna	does	not	have		to	do	what	they	do	because	they	are	in	a	tragedy;	rather,	the	tragedy	arises	because,	by	free	will,	they	do	what	they	do.	There	is	the	‘‘internal	time’’	of	the	story	and	the	‘‘external	time’’	of	the	world	that	includes	its	author.	The	alleged	mistake,	then,	is	to	conflate	the	two	and	hence	to	‘‘imagine	that	it	makes	sense	to	say	that	the	book	is	already,	in	the	internal	time	line	of	the	book,	completed’’	(186).	So	instead,	presumably	we	should	think	of	the	book	as	only	completed	in	some	physical	analogue	of	the	external	time?	But	no,	that	would	be	another	mistake!	The	right	view	is	that	there	is	no	‘‘book’’:	‘‘In	truth,	there	is	for	us	no	Tolstoy,	no	Shakespeare,	no	author	of	our	lives	but	ourselves’’	(186).	The	idea	is	that	the	laws	are	not	‘‘in	place’’	before	we	act.	[A	similar	compatibilist	position	has	recently	been	defended	by	Berofsky	(2012)	whom	Ismael	unfortunately	does	not	cite.]	If	true,	this	counters	the	Consequence	Argument	by	denying	that	the	conjunction	of	the	past	plus	the	laws	of	nature	is	not	under	our	control.	So	far,	so	good,	but	how	should	we	understand	the	claim	that	the	laws	are	not	‘‘in	place’’	before	we	act?	Suppose	laws	are	patterns	in	past,	present,	and	future	events.	Then	if	future	events	only	come	into	existence	as	history	unfolds,	the	laws	do,	too,	or	so	Ismael	argues.	But	elsewhere	(230),	Ismael	explicitly	defends	the	‘‘block	universe’’	view,	on	which	future,	present,	and	past,	co-exist.	Some	would	indeed	argue	that	‘‘unfolding’’	and	‘‘co-existing	in	a	block’’	are	compatible,	but	fundamental	bends	in	the	philosophy	of	time	are	left	to	the	reader	to	negotiate	here.	Perhaps	it	would	be	too	much	to	ask	of	a	book	about	free	will	and	the	self	to	resolve	those,	too,	but	if	we	are	to	avoid	the	looming	threat	of	metaphysical	incoherence,	at	the	end	of	the	day	they	should	be	addressed.	Similarly,	Ismael’s	discussion	of	causation	centers	on	a	defense	of	interventionism	which	is	the	view	that	‘‘causal	information	is	information	about	the	results	of	hypothetical	‘interventions’	on	networks	of	variables’’	(237),	which	in	turn	is	technically	underwritten	by	the	theory	of	Bayesian	networks.	However,	so	far	this	theory	has	mainly	been	used	in	fields	like	machine	learning,	forensic	statistics,	and	the	social	sciences,	including	everyday	psychology.	Its	relationship	to	physics	and	free	will	is	obscure,	even	granting,	pace		Russell,	that	causation	does	play	a	role	in	(at	least	‘‘emergent’’)	physics.		In	conclusion,	however	eloquently	Ismael	presents	her	case	for	compatibilism,	we	fear	that	across	the	fence	hardly	any	incompatibilist	will	change	his	or	her	mind	after	reading	this	book,	predictably	(!)	arguing	that	it	is	Ismael	who	makes	the	category	mistake	of	putting	the	wrong	physics	into	the	Consequence	Argument.	The	jury	is	still	out.	In	any	case,	we	wholeheartedly	recommend	this	delightful	and	richly	rewarding	book	to	anyone	interested	in	free	will	and	the	self.		
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